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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON cou
STATE OF GEORGIA
RUDY BLAKE FRAZIER and BUILDING
TECHNOLOGY CONSULTING LLC
Plaintiffs,
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MATTHEW LIOTTA and PODPONICS, LLC

)
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)

Defendants

Civil Action File No.
2014CV244363

o

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
On August 5, 2014, this Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative for More Definite Statement. Upon consideration of the briefs and arguments of
counsel, the Court rules on the motion as set out herein.
It is well established that:

[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with
certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of
provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the
claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
complaint sufficient to wan-ant a grant of the relief sought. ... In deciding a motion
to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed
them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing
party's favor.
'
Scouten v, Amerisave Mortgage Corp., 283 Ga. 72,73,656

S.E.2d 820, 821 (2008) (quoting

Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997»; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-1112(b)(6).
So viewed, the Complaint states that Plaintiff Building Technology Consulting, LLC
("BTC") was the 40% owner of HydroMod, LLC ("Hydro Mod") and Defendant PodPonics, LLC
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("PodPonics") was the 60% owner. Defendant Matthew Liotta served as Manager of HydroMod
and is a member of PodPonics. Plaintiff Rudy Blake Frazier is a member of BTC.
PodPonics developed a process for growing lettuce in shipping containers and was
interested in selling shipping container grow houses to third parties. Frazier alleges that he
improved PodPonic's original shipping container grow house concept by introducing Liotta to
his invention, a Grow Rack System. Frazier and Liotta, through BTC and PodPonics, formed
HydroMod for the purpose of building and installing Grow Racks for both PodPonics's own use
and sale to third parties. Frazier and BTC provided sweat equity and $400 as their initial
contribution to HydroMod; while Liotta and PodPonics provided financial support. Plaintiffs
allege that from the time of HydroMod's inception, HydoMod had sold 394 Grow Racks, and
HydroMod had developed the ability to fill the orders profitably. Also, PodPonics could buy
Grow Racks from HydroMod to incorporate them into the shipping container grow houses and
then to sell them to third parties.
Frazier also drew up designs for his Grow Rack System so that Liotta could register for a
patent. Frazier believed it would be a patent held by HydroMod, but Liotta, an owner of
PodPonics, registered the patent in PodPonics's name instead.

In addition to his work on the

Grow Rack System on behalf of HydroMod, Frazier alleges that he rendered valuable services
directly to PodPonics. For example, Frazier claims that he helped Liotta and PodPonics market
the PodPonics grow houses internationally to third parties.
Frazier and BTC now claim that Liotta and PodPonics have squeezed them out of the
Grow Rack building venture. First, Plaintiffs claim that PodPonics misappropriated and usurped
a business opportunity with a customer called Desert Group that was developed by and through
HydroMod so that PodPonics could maximize its profits to the detriment of HydroMod.
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Additionally, on January 16,2014, Liotta notified Frazier that he was terminating all contracts

with Frazier and BTC and was dissolving HydroMod. A Certificate of Termination was issued
for HydroMod by the Georgia Secretary of State on January 10, 2014 with an effective date of
December 26,2013.

Frazier claims that he had no knowledge that a Certificate of Termination

had been filed and that he continued to work for HydroMod until the January 16 meeting.
Plaintiffs claim breach of contract, breaches of fiduciary duty, quantum meruit/unjust
enrichment, conversion, fraud and deceit, and tortious interference with contractual or business
relations. They are seeking compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief for the
immediate return of Plaintiffs' drawings and inventions as well as an order directing Defendants
to cease and desist from using these drawings for their own advantage. Defendants seek
dismissal in the entirety on the basis that Plaintiffs are required to bring their claims in a
derivative action, not a direct action, and of each individual claim on the basis of failure to state a
claim.
1.

Direct Action Analysis

As a general rule, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty or misappropriation of corporate
assets by a director or officer of a corporation belongs to the corporation, not its shareholders,
and should be brought as a derivative action. Barnett v. Fullard, 306 Ga. App. 151, 152 (2010).
The reasons underlying this general rule are that it 1) prevents multiple lawsuits by shareholders;
2) protects corporate creditors by putting the damages from the recovery back in the corporation;
3) protects the interest of all shareholders by increasing the value of their shares, instead of
allowing recovery by one shareholder to prejudice the rights of others not a party to the suit; and
4) adequately compensates the injured shareholder by increasing the value of his shares. Thomas
v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 786 (1983). The Georgia Supreme Court, while acknowledging the
3
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general rule, has directed that courts should look to the "realistic objectives" of a given case to
determine if a direct action is proper. ld. (citing Kaplan's Nadler, Georgia Corporation Law, §
11-16 (1971)).

A shareholder may bring a direct rather than a derivative action in the instance of

a closely held corporation where the evidence shows that the reasons for the general rule
requiring a derivative suit do not apply. Barnett, 306 Ga. App. at 152.
Here, BTC and PodPonics are the only two shareholders in HydroMod and both are
parties to the suit so a derivative action is not necessary to prevent multiple lawsuits by
shareholders or prejudice to other shareholders.

Also, by filing the Certificate of Termination on

behalf of HydroMod, the company represented that it did not have any debts or liabilities, so
corporate creditors would not be harmed by allowing Plaintiffs to bring a direct action. And
because HydroMod was dissolved, no shareholder could be prejudiced or injured. HydroMod
was a closely held corporation and none of the four principles underlying the general rule apply
here. Plaintiffs' direct action may be properly maintained. Therefore, it is unnecessary for
Plaintiffs to satisfy O.C.G.A. § 14-11-801(2)

requiring that a plaintiff make a written demand on

the manager or members of the corporation.

2. Individual Claims
A. Breach of Contract
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have only identified one contract in this case-the
HydroMod Operating Agreement-and that a claim for breach of the Operating Agreement fails
for two reasons: (1) Frazier and Liotta are not parties to the Operating Agreement, and (2) the
Operating Agreement does not does not preclude or require either Defendant to carry out the
activities of which Plaintiffs complain. The COUlt agrees that the second reason is fatal to a
claim for breach of the Operating Agreement. HydroMod's Operating Agreement gives Liotta as
4
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Manager and PodPonics as Majority Member broad discretion in conducting the business of
HydroMod.

For instance, the Operating Agreement does not compel Liotta or PodPonics to call

meetings, order an accounting, or continue any exclusive business relationship with BTC or
Frazier. Likewise, the election to dissolve the Company can be (and was) made by majority
vote. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim is GRANTED as to
any alleged breach of the Operating Agreement.
The COUli does, however, find sufficient allegations in the Complaint of side agreements
between Frazier and BTC and either Liotta individually, or Liotta, on behalf of PodPonics, that
are separate from HydroMod's limited purpose of developing and selling Grow Racks. For
instance, Plaintiffs allege that they undertook international marketing efforts to sell the entire
shipping container grow house concept and prepared drawings for a patent application.

Plaintiffs

are not required to plead the facts demonstrating the formation and mutually agreed terms of
these side agreements, if such exist, at this early stage ofthe litigation.

Therefore, Defendants'

motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim is DENIED as to any oral agreements between
the parties that are not contemplated by HydroMod's Operating Agreement.
B. Quantum Meruit I Unjust Enrichment
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claim fails because
this claim only applies when there is no legal contract. "Ordinarily, when one renders service or
transfers property which is valuable to another, which the latter accepts, a promise is implied to
pay the reasonable value thereof."

O.C.G.A. § 9-2-7.

"A claim of quantum meruit requires

proof that (1) the provider performed as agent services valuable to the recipient; (2) either at the
request of the recipient or knowingly accepted by the recipient; (3) the recipient's receipt of
which without compensating the provider would be unjust; and (4) provider's expectation of
5
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compensation at the time of rendition of services."

Bedsole v. Action Outdoor Adver. JV, LLC,

325 Ga. App. 194,200 (2013). It is clear from the allegations of the Complaint that Plaintiffs
claim they were not adequately compensated for drawings used for the patent applications
allegedly submitted by PodPonics for its own benefit or for marketing of the PodPonics grow
houses internationally, an effort that was outside of the scope of the HydroMod venture.
Development of the facts will clarify whether the parties mutually agreed that this work would
be done by Frazier individually or Frazier on behalfofBTC, for Liotta individually, or for Liotta
on behalf of PodPonics. Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled their quantum meruit/unjust
enrichment claim, and Defendants' motion to dismiss this count is DENIED.
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty should fail to the
extent that it relies on the existence of an "overarching partnership." "It is well settled that a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three elements: (1) the existence of a
fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach."
UWork.com, Inc. v. Paragon Techs., Inc., 321 Ga. App. 584, 594 (2013) (citations omitted). "A
fiduciary duty exists where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the
will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence,
the law requires the utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and
agent, etc." ld. at 594-95 (citing O.C.G.A § 23-2-58).

Liotta, as manager of HydroMod, owes

fiduciary duties. It is unclear what fiduciary duties would be owed by Liotta and/or PodPonics
from relationships formed in the course of the side agreements with BTC and Frazier as
discussed above, but the court is unable at this point in the litigation to say that no set of facts
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could be introduced to support this claim .. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' breach of
fiduciary duty claim is DENIED.

D. Conversion
Defendants next argue that any conversion claim would belong to HydroMod. See
Taylor v. Powertel, 250 Ga. App. 356,358

(2001) (noting that for conversion claim to succeed,

plaintiff must show they have a property interest in the designs and drawings that are possessed
and being unlawfully used by Defendants). The Court has already held that BTC can bring a
direct action instead of a derivative action on behalf of HydroMod. Further, Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged that Frazier and BTC designed the Grow Racks for HydroMod but that Liotta
filed a patent application incorporating the Grow Rack system on behalf of PodPonics.
Therefore, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' conversion claim is DENIED.

E. Fraud
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not specifically pled its fraud claim as required by
OCGA § 9-11-9(b) and that a mere failure to perform on a contract does not amount to fraud.
See Brockv. King, 279 Ga. App. 335, 339 (2006).

The elements of fraud are "(1) false

representation by defendant; (2) scienter; (3) intent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from
acting; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) damage to the plaintiff." Lakeside
Investment Group. v. Allen, 253 Ga. App. 448,450

(2002).

Plaintiffs claim that they were

induced to create drawings and designs used for the patent application with the understanding
that the patent would be applied for on behalf of HydroMod, not PodPonics.

Plaintiffs also claim

that Defendants represented that HydroMod would get a higher percentage of profits for direct
sales that it initiated under an agreed pricing structure, but instead, PodPonics sold Grow Racks
directly to clients, Desert Group in particular, in an attempt to cut Plaintiffs out of the profits.
7
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Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants committed fraud by dissolving HydroMod and terminating
all agreements with Frazier and BTC after Plaintiffs were led to believe that they would share in
the profits from their contributions. In Sh01i, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants induced Plaintiffs
into reasonably believing that they were both working towards the goal of making HydroMod a
successful company, while Defendants true intent was to usurp the inventions and opportunities
for their own exclusive gain. The fraud count has been sufficiently pled with particularity and
therefore, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' fraud and deceit claim is DENIED.

F. Tortious interference with contractual or business relations
Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contractual
or business relations must fail because Defendants were not strangers to the alleged business
relationship between HydroMod and its customer, Desert Group. "In order to prevail on a claim
alleging tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a valid
contract and that the defendant acted intentionally, without privilege or legal justification, to
induce another not to enter into or continue a business relationship with the plaintiff, thereby
causing the plaintiff financial injury." Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., Co. v. McLane, 269 Ga. 604,
608 (1998).

In the Atlanta Market case, the Georgia Supreme COUli, recognizing that its ruling

would reduce the number of entities that could maintain such a claim, held that "to be liable for
tortious interference, one must be a stranger to both the contract at issue and the business
relationship giving rise to and underpinning the contract." Id. at 609. "In other words, all
partlies] to an interwoven contractual arrangement are not liable for tortious interference with
any of the contracts or business relationships." Id. Subsequent cases have expanded the so-called
"stranger doctrine" privilege to defendants with a "legitimate economic interest" in the contract
or a party to the contract, even though it is not a signatory to the contract or where there is a
8
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"legitimate relationship of the alleged interloper or meddler to the contract." Tidikis v. Network
for Med. Comm. & Research, LLC, 214 Ga. App. 807,812-13 (2005) (affirmingdismissal of

employee's tortious interference with an employment contract claim against majority shareholder
of employer because majority shareholder had financial interest in employer); see also ULQ,
LLC v. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 183-84 (2008) (holding that terminated officer and 10% owner

of LLC could not interfere with business and contractual relationships between the LLC and debt
collection customer because 10% owner was not a stranger due to his financial interest in LLC);
Mabra v. SF, Inc., 316 Ga App 62, 65 (20 12) (affirming dismissal of produce distributor's

tortious interference with an airport concessionaire's distribution contract claim against
concession corporations that decided to purchase produce from other sources because concession
corporations "had a direct economic interest in or benefitted from the contract at issue" and
therefore were not strangers to the contract despite the complaint's express allegations to the
contrary). The Georgia courts have also extended the stranger doctrine to claims of tortious
interference with business relations where a defendant "caused a party or third party to
discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business relationship with the plaintiff." See
Mabra, 316 Ga. App. at 64 (quoting Tidikis, 274 Ga. App. at 812)); see also Atlanta Mkt. Ctr.
Mgmt., Co., 269 Ga. at 609 n.2 (noting that stranger doctrine applies in tortious interference with

contract and tortious interference with business relationship).
As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege the existence of a
valid contract between HydroMod and Desert Group as required to maintain a tortious
interference with a contract claim. See Atlanta Mkt. Ctr. Mgmt., Co., 269 Ga. at 608. Instead,
they allege "probable additional sales to Desert Group and others" and that "Desert Group had
made it clear that if they were satisfied with the first 20 racks they were purchasing they might
9
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be ordering an additional 200 racks." Compi. ~~ 132,47 (emphasis added).

This illusory

promise by Desert Group does not establish a valid contract, a necessary element of a tortious
interference with contract claim.
Even if the Complaint sufficiently alleged the existence of a contract between HydroMod
and Desert Group, both a tortious interference with contract claim and a tortious interference
with a business relationship claim would fail because Defendants are not strangers to the
interwoven contracts or business relationships. PodPonics had a legitimate financial interest in
HydroModl Desert Group business relationship as the majority member of HydroMod.
Likewise, Liotta had a legitimate fmancial interest in the HydroModiDesert Group business
relationship both as HydroMod's manager and as a member of PodPonics. Above and beyond
the financial interest of the D.efendants, the Complaint asserts that HydroMod's opportunities to
sell Grow Racks directly to customers (as opposed to indirectly through PodPonics as a larger
package deal) would result in an opportunity for PodPonics to sell other items needed to set up a
shipping container grow house. Neither PodPonics nor Liotta were strangers to the business
relationship between HydroMod and Desert Group. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss
for tortious interference of contractual or business relations is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this ~

day of August, 2014.

Judge Melvin K. Westmoreland on behalf of
The Honorable Elizabeth E. Long
Judge, Fulton County Business Court
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Copies to:
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Attorney fer Defendant

Thomas Richelo
RICHELO LAW GROUP, LLC
951 Glenwood Ave.
Unit 1003
Atlanta, Georgia 30316
trichelo@richelolaw.com

Scott Bonder
Joseph A. White
FRIED & BONDER, LLC
White Provision, Suite 305
1170 Howell Mill Rd., N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30318
(404) 995-8808
sbonder@friedbonder.com
jwhite@fIredbonder.com
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